Bioeconomic Model of Community Incentives for Wildlife Management Before and After CAMPFIRE

Carolyn Fischer, Thomas Sterner and Edwin Muchapondwa

Discussion Papers from Resources For the Future

Abstract: This paper formulates a bioeconomic model to analyze community incentives for wildlife management under benefit-sharing programs like the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. Two agents influence the wildlife stock: a parks agency determines hunting quotas, and a local community chooses to either aid or discourage outside poachers. Wildlife generates revenues from hunting licenses and tourism; it also intrudes on local agriculture. We consider two benefit-sharing regimes: shares of wildlife tourism rents and shares of hunting licenses. Resource sharing does not necessarily improve community welfare or incentives for wildlife conservation. Results depend on the exact design of the benefit shares, the size of the benefits compared with agricultural losses, and the way in which the parks agency sets hunting licenses.

Keywords: bioeconomic; CAMPFIRE; community; poaching; wildlife; benefit sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-env, nep-pbe and nep-tur
Date: 2005-03-23
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