Maps of Bounded Rationality

Daniel Kahneman

No 2002-4, Nobel Prize in Economics documents from Nobel Prize Committee

Abstract: The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with the late Amos Tversky (1937-1996) during a long and unusually close collaboration. Together, we explored the psychology of intuitive beliefs and choices and examined their bounded rationality. This essay presents a current perspective on the three major topics of our joint work: heuristics of judgment, risky choice, and framing effects. In all three domains we studied intuitions - thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without much reflection. I review the older research and some recent developments in light of two ideas that have become central to social-cognitive psychology in the intervening decades: the notion that thoughts differ in a dimension of accessibility - some come to mind much more easily than others - and the distinction between intuitive and deliberate thought processes.

Keywords: behavioral economics; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-12-08
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