Subjective Probabilities on Subjectivity Unambiguous Event

Larry Epstein () and J. Zhang

RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)

Abstract: Evidence such as the Ellsberg Paradox shows that decision-makers do not assign probabilities to all events. It is intuitive that they may differ not only in the probabilities assigned to given events but also in the identity of the events to which they assign probabilities. This paper describes a theory of probability that is fully subjective in the sense that both the domain and the values of the probability measure are derived from preference. The key is a formal definition for subjectively unambiguous event'.

Keywords: DECISION MAKING; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; PROBABILITY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C00 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:roc:rocher:456

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)
Address: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, HARKNESS 231 ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A.
Series data maintained by Terry Fisher ().