The Core of Large TU Games

Larry Epstein () and Massimo Marinacci

No 469, RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)

Abstract: For non-atomic TU games nu satisfying suitable conditions, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of nu. Further, such computations yield one of two stark conclusions: either core(nu) is empty or it consists of a single measure that can be expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of $\nu $. In this sense, core theory for a class of games may be reduced to calculus.

Keywords: core; transferable utility; non atomic game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ind
Date: 2000-04
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