Larry Epstein () and
Alvaro Sandroni ()
Additional contact information Alvaro Sandroni: J.L.Kellogg School of Management, MEDS, Northwestern University
No 505, RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)
Abstract:
This paper models an agent in an infinite horizon setting who does not update according to Bayes' Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. Choice-theoretic axiomatic foundations are provided. Then the model is specialized axiomatically to capture updating biases that reflect excessive weight given to (i) prior beliefs, or alternatively, (ii) the realized sample. Finally, the paper describes a counterpart of the exchangeable Bayesian model, where the agent tries to learn about parameters, and some answers are provided to the question "what does a non-Bayesian updater learn?"
More papers in RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) Address: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, HARKNESS 231 ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A. Series data maintained by Terry Fisher ().
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