No 531, RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)
Abstract:
We consider the problem of dividing some amount of an infinitely divisible and homogeneous resource among agents having claims on this resource that cannot be jointly honored. A "rule" associates with each such problem a feasible division. Our goal is to uncover the structure of the space of rules. For that purpose, we study "operators" on the space, that is, mappings that associate to each rule another one. Duality, claims truncation, attribution of minimal rights, and convex combinations are the four operators we consider. We first establish a number of results linking these operators, such as idempotence, commutativity, and distributivity. Then, we determine which properties of rules are preserved under each of these operators, and which are not.
More papers in RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) Address: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, HARKNESS 231 ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A. Series data maintained by Terry Fisher ().
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