Profit Sharing (with workers) Facilitates Collusion (among firms)

Dan Bernhardt () and Christopher P. Chambers

No WP22, Wallis Working Papers from University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy

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Journal Article: Profit Sharing (with Workers) Facilitates Collusion (Among Firms) (2006)
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