Voting Equilibria in Multi-candidate Elections

John Duggan and Yoji Sekiya ()
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Yoji Sekiya: W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy, 107 Harkness Hall, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627-0158, http://mail.rochester.edu/~ysekiya/

No WP52, Wallis Working Papers from University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy

Abstract: We consider a general plurality voting game with multiple candidates, where voter preferences over candidates are exogenously given. In particular, we allow for arbitrary voter indierences, as may arise in voting subgames of citizen-candidate or locational models of elections. We prove that the voting game admits pure strategy equilibria in undominated strategies. The proof is constructive: we exhibit an algorithm, the “best winning deviation” algorithm, that produces such an equilibrium in finite time. A byproduct of the algorithm is a simple story for how voters might learn to coordinate on such an equilibrium.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-pol
Date: 2008-02
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