Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing

Alejandro Saporiti ()

No WP55, Wallis Working Papers from University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy

Abstract: This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is an extended median rule with n - 1 fixed ballots located at the end points of the set of alternatives. As a by-product, the paper also proves that strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property. And it offers a strategic foundation for the so called "single-crossing version" of the Median Voter Theorem, by showing that the median ideal point can be implemented in dominant strategies by a direct mechanism in which every individual reveals his true preferences.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; single-crossing; median voter; positional dictators (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
Date: 2008-03
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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategy-proofness and single-crossing (2009)
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