A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria

Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: n this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. Different outcome functions are then analyzed.

Keywords: Voting; Proportional Rule; Nash Equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-08-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria (2000)
Journal Article: A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria (2007)
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