On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly

Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

Keywords: Plurality Rule; Regular Equilibria; Stable Sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12-08
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Related works:
Working Paper: ON THE GENERIC STRATEGIC STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IF VOTING IS COSTLY (2002)
Journal Article: On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:41

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