Intergenerational Transfers, Lifetime Welfare and Resource Preservation

Simone Valente ()

Departmental Working Papers from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: This paper studies the welfare properties of distortionary transfers in a life-cycle growth model where natural capital is private property. The main result is that, under credible pre-commitment, each newborn generation prefers positive taxes-subsidies to laissez-faire conditions when the resource share in production is suffciently high. By increasing the degree of natural preservation, resource-saving policies raise welfare of all generations except that of the first resource owner, who su®ers a deadweight loss due to taxation of the initial stock. If the first owner renounces part of his claims over initial endowments, all successive generations support resource-saving policies for purely selfish reasons.

Date: 2005-03
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Related works:
Working Paper: Intergenerational Transfers, Lifetime Welfare and Resource Preservation (2006)
Working Paper: Intergenerational Transfers, Lifetime Welfare and Resource Preservation (2005)
Working Paper: Intergenerational Transfers, Lifetime Welfare and Resource Preservation (2006)
Journal Article: Intergenerational transfers, lifetime welfare, and resource preservation (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rtv:ceiswp:214

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