Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties

Gil S. Epstein () and Ira Gang ()

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the decentralization of decision-making in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap.

Keywords: foreign aid; rent seeking; governance; decentralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O10 O19 F35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
Date: 2006-12-01
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://snde.rutgers.edu/Rutgers/wp/2006-29.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:200629

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by ().