Abstract:
When the monetary authority controls the short-term interest rate we find that under a regime of permanent (and even persistent but temporary) deficits that a strict upper bound on the feasible interest rate sequence is present. More generally, the satisfaction of the fiscal authority’s present value budget constraint in the presence of a deficit sequence, means that monetary and fiscal decisions cannot be independent. This is an important caveat to the results in McCallum (1984).
More papers in CDMA Working Paper Series from Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis Address: School of Economics and Finance, University of St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Johannes Geissler ().
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