Information Gathering, Innovation and Growth

Carmelo Pierpaolo Parello ()

No 122, Working Papers from Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Public Economics

Abstract: In this paper we study the economic implications of IPR protection on corporate intelligence, R&D investment and economic growth. To accomplish this objective, we present a dynamic, scale-invariant Schumpeterian model of growth with information gathering and analyze the steady-state effects of introducing stronger protection for firms' confidential information. In doing so, we introduce the trade secret into a standard quality-ladder growth model and study the long-run implications of improving the privacy of firms' data. We find that reducing the set of practices of information gathering is more effective in protecting firms' privacy than strengthening trade secret.

Keywords: R&D investment; trade secret; information gathering; economic growth. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D9 K4 L5 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sap:wpaper:122

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