Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem

Zeno Rotondi and John Driffill

No 292, Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 from Society for Computational Economics

Keywords: credibility; delegation; time-inconsistency; independent central banks; monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E31 E58 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
Date: 2003-08-01
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Working Paper: Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem (2003)
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