Does Central Bank Transparency Matter for Economic Stability

Stefano Eusepi ()

No 176, Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of monetary policy transparency on economic stability, when economic agents are boundedly rational. I first consider a simple class of microfunded general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities and learning. Under a transparent monetary regime, market participants have information about how monetary policy is conducted and use it when forming their forecasts. The paper shows that under plausible assumptions about the model environment, a transparent implementation of simple policy rules improves stability under learning dynamics. It is also shown that, independently of the degree of central bank transparency, the Taylor Principle is generally not sufficient to guarantee robustness of the rational expectations equilibrium to expectational mistakes by the central bank or the private sector. The paper also attempts an evaluation of the benefits of transparency using a calibrated model of US data

Keywords: learnability; inflation targeting; simple feedback rules; endogenous fluctuations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 E52 E58 E3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-mon
Date: 2004-08-11
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf4:176

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