Solving Continuous-Time Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria

Uli Doraszelski and Kenneth L. Judd ()

No 181, Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: We explore methods for solving continuous-time, finite-state dynamic games, and document the advantages of such models over comparable discrete-time models. In particular, continuous-time models are more flexible since they avoid lumpiness in time, and computational methods for continuous-time models avoid a curse of dimensionality that arises in discrete-time models.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; dynamic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf4:181

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