A Computational Approach to Proving Uniqueness in Dynamic Games

Karl Schmedders () and Kenneth L. Judd ()

No 412, Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: Dynamic games are used to analyze dynamic strategic interactions. While existence of equilibrium can often be proved by conventional methods, uniqueness is much more difficult to establish. If a game reduces to solving a system of polynomial equations, then one could use algorithms for finding all solutions to such systems to establish if equilibrium was unique. We study a common type of game where equilibrium can be analyzed as a sequence of small games and apply an all solutions algorithm to each such game

Keywords: nash equilibrium; multivariate polynomials (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11-11
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf5:412

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