Co-Evolution in a Competitive Market

Masayuki Ishinishi () and Akira Namatame ()
Additional contact information
Masayuki Ishinishi: National Defense Academy
Akira Namatame: National Defense Academy

No 1212, Computing in Economics and Finance 1999 from Society for Computational Economics

Abstract: Here we give a model of co-evolution in a society of economic agents, defined as autonomous software entities equipped with their own utility functions. These utility functions are governed by the market mechanism. We also provide an evolutionary explanation of how social competence that motivates coordinated behaviors can emerge through competitive interactions among agents. We must understand the following basic issues: how to get the architecture of an agent as a part of a complex system suitable for evolution, how self-interested behaviors evolve into coordinated behaviors, and how the structure of each goal (utility) function can be modified for globally coordinated behaviors. We show that the concept of sympathy becomes a fundamental element for co-evolution.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-evo and nep-ind
Date: 1999-03-01

Downloads: (external link)
http://fmwww.bc.edu/cef99/papers/ishinishi.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sce:scecf9:1212

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Computing in Economics and Finance 1999 from Society for Computational Economics
Address: CEF99, Boston College, Department of Economics, Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().