Abstract:
Credit Rationing is a common feature of most developing economies. In response to it, the governments of these countries often operate extensive credit programs and lend, either directly or indirectly, to the private sector. We analyze the macroeconomic consequences of a typical government credit program in a small open economy. We show that such programs increase long-run production if the economy is in a development trap and that such programs often lead to endogenously-arising aggregate volatility. On the other hand, they may eliminate certain indeterminacies created by endogenous credit market frictions.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke Date: 1999-03-01
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Related works: Working Paper: On government credit programs (1998) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
More papers in Computing in Economics and Finance 1999 from Society for Computational Economics Address: CEF99, Boston College, Department of Economics, Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().
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