EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Subsidizing charitable contributions: a natural field experiment comparing matching and rebate subsidies

Catherine C Eckel () and Philip Grossman ()
Additional contact information
Philip Grossman: Department of Economics, St. Cloud State University

No 2008-08 Classification-C93, D64, H41, L3, Working Papers from Saint Cloud State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We report the results of a field experiment conducted in conjunction with a mailed fundraising campaign of a nonprofit organization. The experiment is designed to compare the response of donors to subsidies in the form of matching amounts or refunded amounts. Matching subsidies are used by many corporations as an employee benefit; the US federal tax system subsidizes giving by making it tax deductible. The design includes a control group and two levels of subsidy of each type. Our main result is that matching subsidies result in larger total donations to charities than rebate subsidies. The results are qualitatively the same, and quantitatively very similar in magnitude to the lab results, validating lab estimates of responsiveness to subsidies of charitable giving.

Keywords: Field experiment; rebate subsidy; Matching subsidy; Charitable giving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2006-05, Revised 2007-12
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.stcloudstate.edu/economics/documents/Ec ... sidizing12_18_07.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Subsidizing charitable contributions: a natural field experiment comparing matching and rebate subsidies (2008) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:scs:wpaper:0808

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Saint Cloud State University, Department of Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by King Banaian ().

 
Page updated 2009-11-27
Handle: RePEc:scs:wpaper:0808