A Theoretical Foundation of the Porter Hypothesis

Stefan Ambec () and Philippe Barla ()

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: This note shows that, by reducing agency costs, an environmental regulation may enhance pollution-reducing innovation while at the same time increasing firms'private benefit.

Keywords: Renegotiation; Regulation; R&D; Porter Hypothesis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L22 L51 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-03-01
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Published in Economic Letters, 2002, vol. 75, pages 355-360

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Journal Article: A theoretical foundation of the Porter hypothesis (2002)
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