Plea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints

Steeve Mongrain () and Joanne Roberts ()

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University

Abstract: In this paper, we construct a simple model that illustrates a perverse effect associated with plea bargaining in which an increase in sanctions can lead to reduced deterrence. This finding is derived from the interaction of binding budgetary constraints and plea bargaining. In an environment with these institutional features, higher sanctions are not always optimal when resources are limited, even if such sanctions are costless. Such potential phenomena may be useful in explaining the fact that many states have introduced limitations on plea bargaining. Career-concerned prosecutors are necessary for such a result to be present.

Keywords: Plea Bargaining; Budget Constraint; Crime; Prosecutor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 K14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: 2007-05
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Related works:
Working Paper: Plea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints (2009)
Working Paper: Plea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints (2008)
Journal Article: Plea bargaining with budgetary constraints (2009)
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