Abstract:
We develop a model of statistical discrimination in criminal trials. Agents carry publicly observable labels of no economic significance (race, etc.) and choose to commit crimes if their privately observed utility from doing so is high enough. A crime generates noisy evidence, and defendants are convicted when the realized amount of evidence is sufficiently strong. Convicted offenders are penalized either by incarceration or by monetary fines. In the case of prison sentences, discriminatory equilibria can exist in which members of one group face a prior prejudice in trials and are convicted with less evidence than members of the other group. Such discriminatory equilibria cannot exist with monetary fines instead of prison sentences. Our findings have implications for potential reforms of the American criminal justice system.
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More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University Address: Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Working Paper Coordinator ().
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