The Evolution of Communication in a Sender/Receiver Game of Common Interest with Cheap Talk

Jasmina Arifovic () and B. Curtis Eaton ()

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University

Abstract: We study a sender/receiver game in which a large number of players engage in repeated anonymous interactions, over a long time horizon. We expand the standard sender/receiver game by adding a neutral action to the receiver's action space.

Keywords: BARGAINING; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C70 C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

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