The Firm as a Nexus of Strategies

Gregory K. Dow

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University

Abstract: This paper replaces the conventional view of the firm as a nexus of contracts with a strategic approach based on the theory of repeated games, where input contributions and side payments are self-enforcing.

Keywords: ENTERPRISES; CONTRACTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L20 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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