A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions

Dritan Osmani () and Richard S.J. Tol ()

No FNU-150, Working Papers from Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University

Abstract: Non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximize their joint welfare. The joint maxi- mization assumption is compared with di®erent sharing pro¯t schemes such as Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and Consensus Value. The results show that the joint welfare max- imization assumption is similar with Nash Bargaining solution.

Keywords: game theory; coalition formation; joint welfare maximization; Shapley value; Nash bargaining solution; Consensus Value; international environmental agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-gth
Date: 2007-10, Revised 2007-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: A Short Note on Joint Welfare Maximization Assumption (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sgc:wpaper:150

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