The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection

Dritan Osmani () and Richard S.J. Tol ()

No FNU-82, Working Papers from Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University

Abstract: Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agree- ments (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) frequently use the assumption that countries can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assump- tion by considering two self-enforcing IEAs. Extending a model of Barrett (1994a) on a single self-enforcing IEA, we demonstrate that there are many similarities between one and two self- enforcing IEAs. But in the case of few countries and high environmental damage we show that two self-enforcing IEA work far better than one self-enforcing IEA in terms of both welfare and environmental equality

Keywords: self-enforcing international environmental agreements; non-cooperative game theory; stability; nonlinear optimization. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-gth and nep-pbe
Date: 2005-08, Revised 2006-05
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Working Paper: The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sgc:wpaper:82

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