Global Analysis of an Expectations Augmented Evolutionary Dynamics

Angelo Antoci, Antonio Gay (), Massimiliano Landi and Pier Luigi Sacco ()
Additional contact information
Antonio Gay: University of Florence
Pier Luigi Sacco: IUAV, Venice

No 25-2007, Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics

Abstract: We consider a deterministic evolutionary model where players form expectations about future play. Players are not fully rational and have expectations that change over time in response to current payoffs and feedback from the past. We provide a complete characterization of the qualitative dynamics so induced for a two strategies population game,and relate our findings to standard evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection when agents have rational forward looking expectations

Keywords: evolutionary games; dynamic systems; bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
Date: 2007-12
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Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series

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Journal Article: Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics (2008)
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