On Sequential and Simultaneous Contributions under Incomplete Information

Parimal Bag and Santanu Roy ()

No 805, Departmental Working Papers from Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Under incomplete information about (independent) private valuations of a public good, we establish sufficient conditions under which, despite the incentive to free ride on future contributors, the expected total amount of voluntary contributions is higher when agents contribute sequentially (observing prior contributions) rather than simultaneously. We establish this in a conventional framework with quasi-linear utility where agents care only about the total provision of the public good (rather than individual contribution levels) and there is no non-convexity in provision of the public good. We allow for arbitrary number of agents and fairly general distribution of types.

Keywords: Contribution games; public good; incomplete information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H41 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-pbe, nep-sea and nep-upt
Date: 2008-08, Revised 2008-11
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