Agreement, Separability, and Other Axioms for Quasi-Linear Social Choice Problems

Youngsub Chun ()

Working Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University

Abstract: A quasi-linear social choice problem is concerned with choosing one among a finite set of public projects and determining side payments among agents to cover the cost of the project, assuming each agent has quasi-linear preferences. We first investigate the logical relations between various axioms in this context. They are: agreement, separability, population solidarity, consistency, converse consistency, and population-and-cost solidarity. Also, on the basis of these axioms, we present alternative characterizations of egalitarian solutions; each solution assigns to each agent an equal share of the surplus derived from the public project over some reference utility level.

Keywords: quasi-linear social choice problem; axioms; logical relation; egalitarian solutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
Date: 1999-06

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:snu:ioerwp:no19

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