Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations. Lessons from a natural field experiment in Norway

Kjetil Telle

Discussion Papers from Research Department of Statistics Norway

Abstract: Relying on a small natural field experiment with random assignment of treatments, I estimate effects of three core elements of most monitoring and enforcement practices: self-reporting, audit frequency and specific deterrence. I find evidence of evasive reporting of violations in self-audits, as more violations are detected in on-site audits than in self-audits. Announcing the increased audit frequency has no effect on compliance, but an audit raises the firm’s subsequent compliance substantially.

Keywords: environmental regulation; enforcement; EPA; natural field experiment; random assignment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 C93 Q58 D21 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-exp, nep-law, nep-reg and nep-res
Date: 2012-02
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