Horizontal Mergers With Free-Entry: Why Cost Efficiencies May Be a Weak Defense and Asset Sales a Poor Remedy

Luis M B Cabral ()

Working Papers from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics

Date: 2001
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Journal Article: Horizontal mergers with free-entry: why cost efficiencies may be a weak defense and asset sales a poor remedy (2003)
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