A Behavioural Perspective on Keynesian Decision Theory

Martin Jones
Additional contact information
Martin Jones: University of Dundee

No 031/2009, SCEME Working Papers: Advances in Economic Methodology from SCEME

Abstract: Keynes's theory of probability has been studied intensively in the past few years with much discussion of its relevance to modern economics. This paper examines Keynes's ideas in light of criticisms made by other authors and comes to the conclusion that Keynes's views on rationality are critically flawed. However, it is asserted that this actually allows more freedom for investigation when it is combined with insights from behavioural economics and gives examples where this could be fruitful. One of the side-effects of this is that there is a narrowing of the gap between Keynesian and mainstream behavioural views on decision-making.

Keywords: uncertainty; Keynes; behavioral economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-hpe, nep-neu, nep-pke and nep-upt
Date: 2009-02

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sceme.org.uk/wps/SCEME031_Jones_2009.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sti:wpaper:031/2009

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SCEME Working Papers: Advances in Economic Methodology from SCEME
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Matthias Klaes ().