On the Equivalence of Simulteneous and Sequential Binary Elections

Eddie Dekel () and M. Piccione

Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics from University of Southampton, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences

Abstract: We explore sequential voting in symmetric two-option environments. We show that the (informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultaneous voting game are also equilibria in any sequential voting structure. In unanimity games, (essentially) the whole set of equilibria is the same in all sequential structures. We also explore the relationship between simultaneous and sequential voting in other contexts. We illustrate several instances where sequential voting does no better at aggregating information than simultaneous voting. The inability of the sequential structure to use additional information in voting models is distinct from that in the herd-cascade literature.

Date: 1998-01-01

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: On the Equivalence of Simultaneous and Sequential Binary Elections (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:stn:sotoec:9801

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics from University of Southampton, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Chris Thorn ().