Three-Candidate Competition when Candidates Have Valence: The Base Case

Haldun Evrenk ()

No 2008-2, Working Papers from Suffolk University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the Nash Equilibrium of three-candidate unidimensional spatial competition when candidates differ in their non-policy characteristics (valence). If the voters' policy preferences are represented by a strictly convex loss function, and if the voter density is unimodal and symmetric, then a unique, modulo symmetry, local Nash Equilibrium exists under fairly plausible conditions. The global Nash Equilibrium, however, exists when only one candidate has a valence advantage (or disadvantage) while the other two candidates have the same valence

Keywords: Multi-candidate competition; valence; local Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
Date: 2008-03-31
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Related works:
Journal Article: Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case (2009)
Journal Article: Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case (2009)
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