Three-Candidate Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Stochastic Voting

Haldun Evrenk () and Dmitriy Kha ()

No 2010-2, Working Papers from Suffolk University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the effects of stochastic (probabilistic) voting on equilibrium locations, equilibrium vote shares and comparative statics in a setup with three heterogenous candidates and a single-dimensional issue space. Comparing the equilibria with and without stochastic voting, we find that under an appropriate level of uncertainty about voter behavior, the model has a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) that is free from several non-plausible features of the PSNE under deterministic voting. The results are robust to extensions to asymmetric density and plurality maximization.

Keywords: Probabilistic voting; valence; three-candidate competition; centripetal incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
Date: 2010-02-02
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