Optimal sliding scale regulation: An application to regional electricity distribution in England and Wales
David Hawdon,
Lester Charles Hunt (),
Paul Levine () and
Neil Rickman ()
Additional contact information David Hawdon: Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), Department of Economics, University of Surrey
Neil Rickman: Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), Department of Economics, University of Surrey
Abstract:
This paper examines optimal price (i.e. ‘sliding scale’) regulation of a monopoly when productivity and managerial effort are not observed. We show how to operationalise this model of incentive regulation and use actual data from electricity distribution in England and Wales to make welfare comparisons of sliding scale regulation with a stylised price cap regime and the First-Best (the full information case). Our method enables us to quantify technical uncertainty as faced by the electricity regulator in the 1990s and shows that there are significant welfare gains from a sliding scale relative to the stylised price cap regime.