Spectrum Property Rights Versus a Commons Model: Exploitation of Mesh Networks

Paul Levine (), Klaus Moesner and Neil Rickman
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Klaus Moesner: University of Surrey

No 607, Department of Economics Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Surrey

Abstract: This paper combines models and ideas from radio-engineering literature and economics to address the need for regulation of spectrum allocation in a commons scenario. It discusses under what conditions a laissez-faire policy towards spectrum usage would engender the inefficiencies of a spectrum com- mons allocation regime; to overcome such potential inefficiency, centralised allocation or a formal market for spectrum (with well-defined property rights) is required.

Keywords: mesh networks; spectrum allocation; spectrum commons model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 L50 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ipr and nep-net
Date: Written 2007-07

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