Multilateral Non-Cooperative Bargaining in a General Utility Space

Hannu Vartiainen () and Klaus Kultti ()

No 19, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the length of a time period between offers goes to zero. Without the differentiability assumption, convergence need not hold.

Keywords: multilateral; bargaining; general utility set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-09
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