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The European Commission – Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations

Stefan Napel () and Mika Tapani Widgrén

No 6, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted a priori that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament. Empirical analysis suggests that the Council is, in fact, significantly more conservative than Parliament and Commission; the latter two are significantly closer to each other than Council and Commission.

Keywords: European Commission; investiture procedure; voting rules; Council of Ministers; European Parliament (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eec, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Date: 2006-06
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http://www.ace-economics.fi/kuvat/ACE6%20Widgren,%20Napel.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The European Commission–Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: The European Commission – Appointment, Preferences, and Institutional Relations (2007) Downloads
Working Paper: The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations (2006) Downloads
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