International Trade and Global Warming

Jota Ishikawa and Kazuharu Kiyono
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Jota Ishikawa: Faculty of Economics, Hitotsubashi University

No CIRJE-F-78, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: In a non-cooperative strategic environmental regulation, unilateral regulation may yield the so-called "carbon-leakage" and the government choice over the emission taxes and quotas play an important role. Furthermore, the trade and industrial structure of a country critically hinges on the government's policy tools. The paper shows that emission taxes makes the competitive production equilibrium unstable, while emission standards work as "hidden production subsidy" towards emission-intensive industries.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
Date: 2000-06
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