Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems

Hitoshi Matsushima

No CIRJE-F-304, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: We investigate implementation of social choice functions where the central planner has no knowledge about the detail of model specifications, and only a few individuals participate in the mechanism. In contrast with the standard model of implementation, each agent has non-consequential moral preference in that she prefers truth-telling to lying whenever the resulting consequence is unchanged. We show that with complete information, there exists a single, detail-free mechanism that can implement any social choice function whenever agents regard its value as being socially desirable. This result holds even if psychological cost for lying is close to zero. Non-consequential moral preferences play a very powerful role in eliminating unwanted equilibria in detail-free mechanism design with representative systems. We extend this result to incomplete information.

Date: 2004-10
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/dp/2004/2004cf304.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2004cf304

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo
Series data maintained by ().