Behavioral Aspects of Implementation Theory

Hitoshi Matsushima

No CIRJE-F-523, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: This paper incorporates behavioral economics into implementation theory. We use mechanisms that are strictly detail-free. We assume that each agent dislikes telling a white lie when such lying does not serve her/his material interest. We present a permissive result wherein by using just a single detail-free mechanism, any alternative can be uniquely implemented in iterative dominance as long as the agents regard this alternative as being socially desirable.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-hpe
Date: Written

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Journal Article: Behavioral aspects of implementation theory (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2007cf523

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