Imperfect Information Processing in Sequential Bargaining Games with Present Biased Preferences

Zafer Akin ()

No 810, Working Papers from TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics

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Date: 2008-08
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Journal Article: Imperfect information processing in sequential bargaining games with present biased preferences (2009)
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