Inflation, Prices, and Information in Competitive SearchMiquel Faig () and Belén Jerez () Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics Abstract: We study the effects of inflation in a competitive search model where each buyer\'s utility is private information, and where money is essential in facilitating trade. The equilibrium is efficient at the Friedman rule, but inflation creates an inefficiency in the terms of trade. Buyers experience a preference shock after they are matched with a seller, and thus they have a precautionary motive for holding money. Sellers, who compete to attract buyers, post non-linear price schedules to screen out different types of buyers. As inflation rises, sellers post relatively flat price schedules which reduce the need for buyers to hold precautionary balances. These price schedules induce buyers with a low desire to consume to purchase inefficiently high quantities because of the low marginal cost of purchasing goods. In contrast, buyers with a high desire to consume purchase inefficiently low quantities as they face binding liquidity constraints. The reduction of precautionary balances as inflation rises allows the model to fit historical US data on velocity and interest rates. Keywords: inflation; precautionary money demand; competitive search; private information. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics |
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