The Allocation of Merit Pay in Academia
Finn Christensen (),
James Manley () and
Louise Laurence ()
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Louise Laurence: Department of Economics, Towson University
No 2010-13, Working Papers from Towson University, Department of Economics
This paper investigates whether the widespread awarding of faculty merit pay at a large public university accurately reflects productivity. We show that pairwise voting on a quality standard by a committee can in theory be consistent with observed allocation patterns. However, the data indicate only nominal adherence to a quality standard. Departments with more severe compression issues are more likely to award merit pay as a countermeasure and some departments appear to be motivated by nonpecuniary incentives. Much of the variance in merit pay allocation remains unexplained. These results suggest reform is needed to improve transparency in the merit system.
JEL-codes: D7 I20 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-sog
Date: 2010-07, Revised 2010-07
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tow:wpaper:2010-13
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