An Agent-Based Model of Centralized Institutions, Social Network Technology, and Revolution
Michael Makowsky () and
Jared Rubin ()
No 2011-05, Working Papers from Towson University, Department of Economics
Recent uprisings in the Arab world consist of individuals revealing vastly different preferences than were expressed prior to the uprisings. This paper sheds light on the general mechanisms underlying large-scale social and institutional change. We employ an agent-based model to test the impact of authority centralization and social network technology on preference revelation and falsification, social protest, and institutional change. We find that the amount of social and institutional change is decreasing with authority centralization in simulations with low network range but is increasing with authority centralization in simulations with greater network range. The relationship between institutional change and social shocks is not linear, but rather is characterized by sharp discontinuities. The threshold at which a shock can ï¿½tipï¿½ a system towards institutional change is decreasing with the geographic reach of citizen social networks. Farther reaching social networks reduce the robustness and resilience of central authorities to change. This helps explain why highly centralized regimes frequently attempt to restrict information flows via the media and Internet. More generally, our results highlight the role that information and communication technology can play in triggering cascades of preference revelation and revolutionary activity in varying institutional regimes.
Keywords: preference falsification; revolution; protest; network technology; agent-based model. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 Z13 D83 D85 D71 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-ict, nep-net and nep-soc
Date: 2011-10, Revised 2011-10
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tow:wpaper:2011-05
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