CREP - Cattle Receiving Enhanced Pastures? Investigating Landowner Response to Federal Incentives
James Manley () and
Jason Mathias ()
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Jason Mathias: City of Baltimore
No 2015-01, Working Papers from Towson University, Department of Economics
Using enrollment data on the enhanced CRP's river buffer subprogram from 1998 to 2010 we find that participation incentives are larger for cattle pasture and that enrollments increase at a higher rate in counties with large amounts of cattle ranching. Counties producing cattle receive almost twice as much in up-front incentives, and the marginal effect of that incentive is also higher. This is probably due to the fact that cattle ranchers can use heavily subsidized "cost share" funding to improve their ranches. Accounting for the cattle effect also helps explain previous findings of apparent producer preference for up-front payments over a discounted stream of annual benefits. This preference is replicated but disappears when we control for cattle production.
Keywords: Agricultural Economics; Agricultural Policy; Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program; Conservation Reserve Program; Landowner Incentives; Subsidy Response; Cattle Ranching. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 Q15 Q24 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-env
Date: 2015-01, Revised 2015-01
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http://webapps.towson.edu/cbe/economics/workingpapers/2015-01.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: CREP: Cattle Receiving Enhanced Pastures? Investigating Landowner Response to Federal Incentives (2017)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tow:wpaper:2015-01
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